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Cheap Talk and Credibility
"Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness." Sunita Sah, Don A. Moore, Robert J. MacCoun. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Volume 121, Issue 2, July 2013, Pages 246–255.
Abstract
Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.
Additional Information
Available online.